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In this paper, we examine the experiences of young people born in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) who are part of the 1.5 migrant generation living in “Brexit
Britain.” We focus on two key themes: (a) young people's feelings of belonging to
Britain, their countries of birth and Europe, and the ways in which these have been
impacted by the EU Referendum result; (b) young people's future plans, in an inter-
generational context, with particular regard to their feelings of belonging and the rup-
tures of migration and Brexit. Britain's decision to leave the EU caused uncertainty for
CEE 1.5 generation young people at a time when many of them were consciously
reflecting on their beings, becomings, and belongings. The majority of young people
asserted a sense of belonging to Britain whilst simultaneously feeling a sense of “in‐
between‐ness.” Many young people wanted to remain living in Britain, at least in
the short term, and felt a sense of belonging to Britain. Our focus on the potential
intergenerational impact of Brexit suggests that CEE young people and parents may
view possibilities for the future differently; we examine some of the key reasons for
these differences from the young people's perspectives.
KEYWORDS
1.5 generation, Brexit, Central and Eastern Europe, migration, young people1 | INTRODUCTION
“Brexit means Brexit,” the Prime Minister, Theresa May, famously
declared in the aftermath of the EU Referendum in June 2016. At
the time of writing, in June 2018, Britain has triggered Article 50,
and negotiations on Britain's exit from the EU are ongoing. However,
the public is still unclear over the details of what kind of relationship
Britain will have with the EU once it leaves in March 2019, if the
agreed period of negotiations is not extended by agreement with the
EU member states. What has become clear, in the time since the
2016 Referendum, is that Brexit is very likely to have significant impli-
cations not just for Britain's place in Europe, but also for its demo-
graphic makeup and promoted national identity.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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debate on immigration. Questioning the exclusively economic explana-
tion for themajority pro‐Brexit vote, Virdee andMcGeever (2017) exam-
ine the discursive dimensions of the Leave campaign and show how this
was built on a narrative which aimed to reinstate the sovereign will of the
British people, exemplified through slogans such as “Let's take back con-
trol.” Indeed, the Leave campaign led by both theUKIP party and sections
of the Conservative party focused on a politics of reasserting Britishness
as an identity which must be preserved and reasserted in the face of the
threat of increasing immigration. Virdee and McGeever (2017) call this a
politics of nationalist resentment, which comes in a long history of
racialised identities constructed in relation to migrants and feelings of
national belonging, and debates on who has a right to belong. Stocker- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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2 of 10 TYRRELL ET AL.(2017) traces the re‐emergence of anti‐immigration discourse and
popular racism against Commonwealth migration to Enoch Powell's
1968 “rivers of blood” speech andMargaret Thatcher's 1978 “swamping”
statement. The government's rhetoric on race, culture, and national
identity and the politics of racial and migrant resentment have been
perpetuated in the posteconomic collapse of 2008 by New Labour's
administration (led by Gordon Brown) with the well‐publicised slogan
of “British jobs for British workers,” the rise of the UKIP who led a
sustained anti‐immigration campaign, and the more recent anti‐EU
slogans from Conservative's Theresa May in 2016: “If you believe you
are a citizen of the world, you're a citizen of nowhere.”
Britain has experienced significant in‐migration following the
accession of 10 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the
EU successively in 2004 and 2007. Of the 3,650,000 EU nationals esti-
mated as currently living in the United Kingdom (Office for National
Statistics [ONS], 2017a), about half (1,876,000) are from the EU8 and
EU2 countries. Around a quarter of all EU migrants in Britain are Polish
(1,000,000), followed by Irish (398,000), Romanian (340,000), German
(299,000), Italian (267,000), and Lithuanian nationals (190,000). Of the
228,000 EU nationals residing in Scotland, the majority (128,000) are
from the EU accession states, especially Poland (ONS, 2017a). The
unpredicted wave of postaccession mobility is geographically diverse
and whilst a large proportion of migrants reside in large urban areas,
rural, and semiurban areas have also experienced demographic changes
(De Lima, 2012; Shubin, 2012). However, despite research showing the
economic benefits of migration (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014), structural
disadvantage and discrimination among CEE migrants is widely
evidenced (McGhee, Heath, & Trevena, 2013; Moskal, 2016).
The anti‐immigration rhetoric and the message of re‐gaining
power and control from the EU over national affairs were clearly
determining aspects of the Brexit vote, whilst public attitudes to immi-
gration and the EU were shown to turn increasingly negative as the
referendum campaign progressed (Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley,
2017). The sharp increase in the number of hate crime and online
“xeno‐racism” incidents recorded by the police in the month after
the referendum was another clear sign of racist hate, with many White
migrants, especially Polish, reported as victims (Burnett, 2016).
Recent population statistics (ONS, 2017b) show that UK net
migration has seen a significant decrease since the Brexit Referendum,
with lower numbers of EU nationals arriving in the United Kingdom
(about 19% fewer), and a significant increase (29%) in the number of
EU nationals leaving the United Kingdom when compared with the
previous year (2016). Whilst the referendum vote was clearly linked
to the increasing rate of net migration Britain has experienced since
EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, the (non‐British and non‐Irish)
EU citizens residing in the United Kingdom were cast as “the others”
in the referendum debate, with a clear denial of their voice or scope
for active citizenship through voting rights. Unlike local, and in some
cases national, elections, where EU nationals with settled status could
vote, the Brexit Referendum was constructed as a “British‐only mat-
ter,” an issue of British national identity. As most EU nationals residing
in Britain do not have British citizenship (ONS, 2017a), either by choice
or because of the costly and complicated process of securing it, they
found themselves powerless spectators in the vote which decided
their future—as EU nationals living in a soon‐to‐be non‐EU country.This paper examines the experiences of CEE‐born young people
who arrived in the United Kingdom as children, mainly as a result of
their parents' (defined as first generation) decision to take advantage
of free movement within the EU, and have lived here for 3 years or
more. Whilst it is difficult to get an accurate estimate of the number
of CEE‐born young people currently living in the United Kingdom
(defined as the 1.5 generation), ONS (2017a) figures estimate that
about 815,000 non‐British EU citizens (not exclusively from CEE
countries) are under the age of 16, with about 300,000 of them being
born in the United Kingdom (second generation). This suggests that
about 500,000 young people aged under 16 have migrated to the
United Kingdom as children from other EU states. In addition, other
young people aged 16–18 who are possibly part of the 1.5 generation
are recorded as adult migrants in the ONS statistics.
A person's age at the time of a key life transition—such as migra-
tion, and now Brexit—is crucial to understanding the ways in which
they become involved in new regimes and societies (Fulbrook,
2011). The 1.5 generation CEE migrants who are the focus of this
paper represent a unique group, as a result of experiencing part of
their formative socialisation in their country of origin and another part
in their country of destination. For the young people in our study,
who were born in CEE countries, but many of whom have lived most
of their formative years in the United Kingdom, what it means to
belong in Britain is being deconstructed during the crucial time of
their transitions from childhood to youth and adulthood, due to
Brexit.
In this paper, conceptual understandings of belonging relating to
migrant children are deepened as the uncertainty caused by the United
Kingdom's decision to leave the EU has occurred at a time when many
CEE‐born young people are consciously reflecting on who they are
(their beings), who they can be (their becomings), and where and
who they do/will feel attached to (their belongings). For CEE‐born
young people who have spent much of their childhood in the United
Kingdom, have experienced a large proportion (if not all) of their edu-
cation in the British education system and cannot necessarily remem-
ber living in their origin countries (even though they might often visit
them), the multiple impacts of Brexit are highly significant. Population
geographers have emphasised the importance of life course transitions
and overlapping (family) life courses (Tyrrell & Kraftl, 2015), and in this
paper, we show how Brexit may cause a significant and unexpected
rupture (Coe, Reynolds, Boehm, Meredith Hess, & Rae‐Espinoza,
2011; King, 2018) in CEE migrant young people's life courses—their
beings, becomings, and belongings—which will have lasting impacts.
The ways in which Brexit will impact upon their decision‐making in a
whole host of areas—education, employment, migration, family life—
have yet to be played out. By focusing on CEE young people's opinions
and experiences in the period between the referendum result and the
United Kingdom's exit from the EU, this paper provides some illumina-
tion on the question many people living in and beyond the United
Kingdom are considering—“What next?” We examine young people's
feelings of belonging to Britain, their countries of birth, and Europe
and the ways in which these have been impacted by the EU Referen-
dum result. We then take an intergenerational perspective to explore
the future plans of the young people, with particular regard to their
feelings of belonging and the ruptures of migration and Brexit.
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RUPTURES: EXPERIENCES OF CEE 1.5
GENERATION MIGRANTS
The life stage of childhood, with its blurred boundaries, is often consid-
ered as highly significant for psychosocial development—composing of
a dialectic of “being” and “becoming” (Tisdall & Punch, 2012; Worth,
2009). Recently, greater consideration of young people's social relation-
ships in different contexts has led to some researchers moving beyond
the commonly accepted duality of young people as “being” and “becom-
ing” (James & Prout, 1997) to an extended typology that includes
“belonging” (Sumsion & Wong, 2011; Tisdall & Punch, 2012). Drawing
on theoretical work on identity and belonging, child migration
researchers have emphasised the need to recognise young people's
experiences of migration in the “here and now” and how it is intertwined
with their feelings of identity and belonging (Ní Laoire, Carpena‐Mendez,
Tyrrell, & White, 2010; Tyrrell, White, Ní Laoire, & Carpena‐Mendez,
2012; White, Ní Laoire, Tyrrell, & Carpena‐Mendez, 2011). Migration
during childhood, particularly in Europe, often has been viewed as a
rupture in young people's lives—a rupture in the perceived norm of
residential fixity, disturbing young people's social networks, and interfer-
ing with their educational pathways. CEE young people's experiences of
migration as rupture (Coe et al., 2011), overlaid by Brexit uncertainty, are
interrogated further in this paper, with a focus on their feelings of
belonging and plans for the future within an intergenerational context.
The 1.5 generation occupy a unique place of “in‐between‐ness” that
first and second generation migrants do not have (Vildaitė, 2016). Where
the literature broadly suggests that first generation migrants identify
morewith their country of origin and second generationmigrants identify
more with their country of destination, 1.5 generation migrants tend
towards more complex identities that may include multiple conceptions
of home and belonging (Gardner, 2012; Kim & Duff, 2012; Ní Laoire
et al., 2010; Zubida, Lavi, Harper, Nakash, & Shoshani, 2013). This sense
of in‐between‐ness often felt by 1.5 generation migrants may take
several forms: (a) in‐between origin and destination; (b) in‐between youth
and adulthood; and (c) in‐between majority and minority cultures in the
host society (Bartley & Spoonley, 2008: 68). In‐between‐ness leads to
multiple feelings of belonging and unbelonging and can have a significant
impact on the settlement process itself and on the outcomes of settle-
ment, at a critical stage in the psychosocial development of young people.
Prior to Brexit, the continuum of belonging–unbelonging sometimes
had been overlooked in research with adult migrants within the EU (see
Ryan, 2018), perhaps due to the assumption of unproblematic belonging
being inherent in free movement. Studies of child migrants in Europe,
however, have focused explicitly on these issues because of the
immediacy associated with “integrating” young people into schools and
communities. They have explored young migrants' feelings of belonging,
social construction of identities, and their reflexivity in social positionings
(see Forbes & Sime, 2016; Moskal & Tyrrell, 2016; Ní Laoire et al., 2010;
Ross, 2015; Sime & Fox, 2015; Tyrrell et al., 2012).
Recent research that has focused on EU migrants' experiences
since Brexit has highlighted the disruption to the belonging–
unbelonging continuum for young adults. For example, Lulle,
Moroşanu, and King (2018), in a recent study of EU‐born youth aged
18–35 living in London, showed the affective impact of Brexit andhow they experienced “othering” in the referendum. With the
prospect of losing their privileges as EU nationals, many said Brexit
has made them consider their settlement plans more seriously, by
thinking about securing citizenship or moving on to other countries.
Drawing on Bauman's (2000) concept of “liquid migration,” Lulle
et al. show that for many young adults the characteristics of liquid
migration, such as temporariness, unpredictability, and openness to
new experiences and places, have been undermined by Brexit as
political rupture. Brexit was also seen by many EU migrants as a
destabiliser to their sense of belonging in the United Kingdom. Whilst
for the first generation migrants in their study the possibilities for
work and unrestricted mobility were the main concerns, there were
also emotional consequences, expressed as anger, consternation, and
rejection experienced postreferendum.
Many of the young people in our study had migrated to Britain to
join parents who had migrated first, that is, they experienced reunifi-
cation with family members in the United Kingdom, and as such can
be called 1.5 generation migrants. Some of their parents may have
begun their moves to the United Kingdom engaged in Bauman's
(2000) “liquid migration”, but family attachments, the desire to live
with their children and provide them a better life in Britain (rather than
sending remittances home for them) led to the reestablishment of
daily family connectivity in the United Kingdom. Once stable employ-
ment and housing had been secured in the United Kingdom, some-
times a process which took several years, young people joined their
parents and the family was re‐unified. In some families, only some of
the children moved to the United Kingdom, leaving siblings in their
birth country for reasons such as age or stage of education. In other
families, the intention had been that the migration period would be
short, but as circumstances changed, they had decided to stay.
Parents' concern for children's education and well‐being—fear that
they would not settle back into the school system in the home country
or that their education and employment prospects were better in the
United Kingdom—and children's own expressed desire to remain in the
United Kingdom often influenced these familial decisions. These pro-
cesses of family migration from CEE countries to Britain can be suc-
cinctly summed up in the wider definition of “lifestyle migration”
that King (2018) has espoused in research with CEE young adult
migrants in Europe. He suggests that lifestyle migration is about more
than having leisure and relaxation (see O'Reilly & Benson, 2009)—for
young adult CEE migrants, it is about getting better and higher paid
work (King, 2018). For CEE family migrants, it is about a better quality
of family life that Britain offered them. The result of these migration
decisions and processes has been that in spite of migration flow
predictions, CEE parents and children are one of the largest migrant
groups living in communities across Britain.3 | METHODOLOGY
This paper draws on findings from the “Here to Stay? Identity, citizen-
ship and belonging among settled Eastern European migrant children
and young people in the UK”1 project. The project used multiple
methods to explore the lives of young people (aged 12–18) who
arrived in the United Kingdom as migrant children from CEE countries
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discussed in the paper are from an online survey of over 1,100 CEE‐
born young people who had lived in the United Kingdom for 3 years
or more, interviews with adult stakeholders and 20 focus groups with
young CEE‐born migrants aged 12–18 in England and Scotland.2
The online survey took place between October 2016 and April
2017, a few months after the June 2016 EU Referendum. In total,
1,120 young people participated in the survey, with 806 full comple-
tions.3 Advertised through schools and social media, the survey
attracted mainly young people aged 16–18 (68%), whereas 32% of
respondents were aged 12–15. There were more female respondents
(60%) than male (38%), and the vast majority of respondents (97%)
identified as White (n = 1,062). Over half of the respondents were Pol-
ish (56%), followed by Romanian (10%) and Lithuanian (9%) nationals.
The other 25% of the respondents were originally born in other EU
and non‐EU countries to Eastern European parents. Most respondents
lived in England (71%) and some in Scotland (19%), whereas 10% did
not give their current location. Over a third said they had lived in
the United Kingdom for 10 or more years. Data from the survey were
analysed using descriptive statistics.
In‐depth semistructured interviews were carried out with stake-
holders from a range of organisations working with CEE‐born migrant
young people across the United Kingdom. These included senior rep-
resentatives and frontline staff such as English as an additional lan-
guage managers and teachers (7), education managers (5), social
work, health and psychological services (4), police (2), and voluntary
sector and diaspora organisations (9). All interviews were transcribed
and coded using a thematic analysis approach.
In addition to the interviews with stakeholders and the survey, 20
focus groups were carried out with young people who met the inclu-
sion criteria (born to CEE parents and had lived in the United Kingdom
for 3 years or more). These focus groups took place in schools, com-
munity and diaspora groups across the United Kingdom and explored
in detail some of the emergent issues from the survey, focusing on
feelings of identity and belonging, access and use of local services,
and the implications of Brexit. In total, 122 young people (55 female
and 57 male participants), all aged 12–18, were involved in the focus
groups which took place between May and November 2017 across
the United Kingdom in urban (11), semiurban (3), and rural (6) areas.
The focus groups used a toolkit for creative engagement called Ketso
(www.ketso.com) to allow all of the young people to fully participate
in the group discussions. The Ketso toolkit was used by participants
to express ideas on issues posed to them by writing or drawing on
“leaves”, which are then displayed by group agreement in creative
ways to represent the range of ideas on the topics posed to the group.
During the activity, new issues emerged and all individuals had an
equal chance to contribute, as the activity allowed participants to con-
tribute through written or spoken words and visuals. The issues we
used to structure the focus groups included relationships, places,
belonging, citizenship, and identities.
All focus groups and interviews took place in English and were
recorded and transcribed in full, in order to allow in‐depth thematic
analysis. To develop the analytical framework, three interview tran-
scripts were coded independently by the research team, who then
agreed on a framework for analysis to be applied to the remaininginterview data. The same process was used in the analysis of the focus
group data. Separate coding frames were developed for the interview
and focus group data sets to reflect their different foci and contexts.
The remainder of the paper discusses the findings in relation to two
key themes which emerged from the analysis: (a) how 1.5 generation
CEE migrants living in Britain feel about Brexit in relation to their
experiences of childhood migration and their feeling of belongings to
Britain, their birth country, and Europe; and (b) what their plans and
their parents' plans are in the context of Brexit.4 | “ IT 'S COMPLICATED” : BREXIT
UNCERTAINTY AND RUPTURED
BELONGINGS
In this section, we explore how 1.5 generation CEE young people living in
Britain felt about Brexit during the period immediately after the EU
Referendum result. We pay particular attention to their feelings of
belonging to Britain, their countries of birth, and the EU in the context
of their previousmigrations. Brexit has been described as “rupture” (King,
2018), and for the majority of the young people in our study, the rupture
that Brexit represents in their lives has been layered on top of the expe-
rience ofmigration to theUnited Kingdom as a rupture in their childhood.
Many of the young people in the study perceived Brexit to be sig-
nificant challenge, compounding the challenges they had faced since
moving to Britain during childhood—moving home, learning English,
going to school, making friends, and living in new communities. As
Ní Laoire et al. (2010) highlighted in their study of CEE migrant young
people living in Ireland, migration means doing childhood differently—
in different places, with different people and with different resources.
For some young people, the rupture caused by migration when they
moved to Britain several years ago had resulted in them experiencing
multiple difficulties, particularly with socialisation.I think moving country at the age of eight‐and‐a‐half
messed something up in my head a bit, because when I
was a kid, I was very social and active, but since
coming to UK I have become a lot more introverted.
Secondly, I feel like I don't belong anywhere now, as I
will never be British or understand the ways of British
and I don't feel fully Latvian and certainly cannot relate
to people there […]. (Survey Respondent, female, 14,
from Latvia)
I moved when I was nine and found it extremely hard to
integrate and I had to learn English from almost
scratch, losing social skills throughout that period and
became more introverted. When a child is around the
age of ten and moves to another country, it is hard for
them to fully be able to identify with either country and
hence if one wants to take their child somewhere else,
it best be at an early age. (Survey Respondent, male,
17, from Poland)For young people who had experienced intense or protracted dif-
ficulties associated with their migration to Britain, Brexit uncertainty
represented another rupture in their lives that created disturbance
TYRRELL ET AL. 5 of 10to their feelings of belonging. However, simply returning to their
country of birth was considered by the majority of young people to
be problematic, because their experiences of migration and living in
Britain had ruptured their sense of belonging to their home country.
The uncertainty over their migration status that Brexit introduced
had reawakened or reinforced their sense of unbelonging to Britain.I don't feel as much as a part of England after Brexit as
I'm uncertain of the future. However, I don't feel as a
part of Lithuania and I couldn't go back there. (Survey
Respondent, female, 14, from Lithuania)
I feel Polish but I don't want to go back to Poland. I want
to stay here. (Focus Group Participant, female, 16, from
Poland)Many young people occupied an in‐between space that has been
identified in other research with 1.5 generation young people (Bartley
& Spoonley, 2008; Gardner, 2012; Ní Laoire et al., 2010), a space that
they had been prompted to both reflect upon and experience more
since the EU Referendum result.If I leave the UK I'm f*****, man. I can't speak Polish that
well nor write it. I'm planning to stay for life. In terms of
short term plans, I intend to go to university. I don't like
to identify as Polish, but I don't feel English either. It's
complicated LOL, I feel human I suppose;‐) (Survey
Respondent, male, 18, from Poland)
I would like people to understand that neither countries
feel like a home to someone like me. […] My family
doesn't really see me as a Pole and the people here
don't see me as a British person. (Survey Respondent,
female, 14, from Poland)The vast majority of the participants in the study (92%) had
retained citizenship of their country of birth, even though many of
them had been in the United Kingdom for more than 5 years. Research
has shown, however, that some young people do not choose to
express one particular national identity or assert a sense of belonging
to an individual nation; instead, young people may live out
multibelonging, with feelings of attachment being felt and expressed
in different ways at different times and scale (Ní Laoire et al., 2010).
This was the experience for some of the young people in our study
during the period of Brexit uncertainty. Many of them had been
shocked by the result of the EU Referendum, and in our survey, 81%
of young people did not feel hopeful about their futures because of
the United Kingdom's decision to leave the EU. The EU Referendum
result and the uncertainty caused by the Brexit political discourse
had prompted many of our survey respondents to consider (or recon-
sider) their sense of belonging to the United Kingdom. For example,
the majority of respondents said that they felt a sense of belonging
to the United Kingdom: 29.4% said they “definitely” felt that they
belonged in the United Kingdom, 33.2% said that they felt they
belonged “most of the time,” and 20.1% said they felt that they
belonged “a little.” For them, Brexit had not meant that they had
stopped feeling this sense of belonging, but it had prompted them to
explore their social positioning—how they are viewed by thoseexternal to themselves—and in some cases, to question their right to
belong in Britain as non‐British EU citizens. The future lives they had
planned were now perceived as being less influenced by their own
decision‐making than they had thought prior to the referendum and,
therefore, as more precarious.I feel like I belong in the UK, however I am fearful of what
will happen now. I'm scared for my future and how the
Referendum will affect me. (Survey Respondent, female,
17, from Poland)
Because of Brexit, my future is uncertain. […] Something
might change for people who are not originally from the
country, so maybe the employment and stuff. (Focus
Group Participant, male, 16, from Bulgaria)Furthermore, 56.4% of survey respondents felt uncertain about
Brexit, 54.1% felt worried and 27% felt scared.4 The questioning of
their right to have moved to the United Kingdom, the lack of certainty
over their right to continue living here and what “settled status” will
mean in reality, has left many CEE young people fearful for their
futures, even if they felt a sense of belonging to the United Kingdom.Because of the Referendum I am scared to be living here
for the first time in my life. I have been living here for over
10 years. It is my home. The thought of leaving it behind,
terrifies me. […] This is our home and it breaks my heart
that in a couple of years it may not be home anymore.
(Survey Respondent, female, 15, from Poland)
I feel like Brexit has created a lot of uncertainty around
my university application, universities are asking more
questions and there is no definite answer whether it's
possible for my fees to go up whilst I'm at university.
(Survey Respondent, female, 17, from Poland)Other young people in the survey and focus groups expressed a
very strong sense of belonging to the United Kingdom and described
Britain as their home, even if they were not British citizens. They did
not feel a sense of in‐between‐ness that is common for 1.5 generation
migrants. Our survey analysis showed that feelings of belonging to the
United Kingdom were stronger the longer young people had lived in
the United Kingdom.5Well, firstly I suppose I have to say I don't really think of
myself as an immigrant. I lived here for most of my life
and until the Brexit Referendum results came in, I didn't
really reflect, acknowledge or even consider how being
born in Poland could possibly impact my life, mainly
because I never thought it would. […] For the most part,
I treat my Polish identity as more of a quirky quality
than a defining factor of my personhood (which is again
unnerving, when I reflect on what a big impact it could
potentially have on my life in a post Brexit Britain).
(Survey Respondent, female, 18, from Poland)
I love this country, I love every inch of the beautiful, green
British land and countryside. I am very grateful that I was
allowed to move to this country and settle here among
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all, British citizens. My family was given an opportunity
for a new life, new home and future along with my
education, health care services and government support.
I feel like I have debt to British nation that I want to
repay by my future job aspiration in service in the
British army or police. […] I do also hope for changes
that will make lives better in the UK after Brexit for
everyone. (Survey Respondent, male, 17, from Poland)Only 3.9% of survey respondents said that they “definitely” did
not feel that they belonged in Britain, and Brexit was reinforcing these
feelings of unbelonging.I have never felt English or British and since Brexit I feel
more Polish than ever. […] I have no intentions of
staying in the UK for university, as I simply don't belong
here. (Survey Respondent, female, 17, from Poland)A source of continuity for many young people since they had expe-
rienced the rupture of intra‐EU migration during childhood and were
now experiencing Brexit uncertainty whilst living in Britain was to
express a strong feeling of belonging to Europe; 92.4% of survey
respondents said that they felt European. Despite Brexit, a sense of
connection and belonging to Europe, the belonging which had enabled
their free movement to Britain in the first place, was felt keenly. How-
ever, some young people were now grappling with how their sense of
belonging to Europe was impacted by Britain's decision to leave the EU.I feel like a European more than anything. The Brexit
Referendum has me severely worried for the future of
this country, its people and foreigners living here.
(Survey Respondent, male, 16, from Czech Republic)
I don't consider myself as belonging in Hungary or the UK
entirely, although I feel that I mainly belong in the UK. I
consider myself an EU national and would love to
maintain that right. (Survey Respondent, female, 17,
from Hungary)
I feel very connected to Europe and European culture.
There has been some concern regarding whether I want
to stay in this country in the future due to the political
changes happening in the UK. I am considering moving
to the EU after finishing university, despite the fact I
enjoy living in this country. (Survey Respondent, male,
18, from Latvia)In summary, in our study a small number of CEE 1.5 generation
young people felt a very strong sense of belonging to Britain and
called Britain “home.” A small number of young people felt the oppo-
site—their country of birth was their “home,” and they did not feel any
sense of belonging to Britain. The vast majority of young people did
express some feeling of belonging to Britain but also felt a sense of
“in‐between‐ness.” These findings support other research with 1.5
generation migrants and the idea that migration during childhood is
an experience of rupture. However, our research also shows that, for
some CEE young people, Brexit has ruptured their developing senseof belonging to Britain because their right to belong (as EU citizens)
has been called into question at a time when they were planning their
futures. As they were overcoming the rupture of childhood migration
itself, Brexit has introduced another rupture in their lives, one that was
unexpected, but is highly significant for their future plans. These mul-
tiple ruptures go some way towards explaining why so many CEE 1.5
generation young people expressed worry about what Brexit might
entail for them (and for others), and uncertainty when planning for
their futures.5 | “WHAT NEXT?” : YOUNG PEOPLE'S
BREXIT PLANS IN INTERGENERATIONAL
CONTEXT
The vast majority of young people in our study expressed a desire to
remain living in Britain, at least in the short term, despite Brexit. About
75.2% of survey respondents said they were “likely” or “very likely” to
continue living in the United Kingdom. Given that the majority of CEE‐
born young people in our study expressed some degree of feeling that
they belonged to the United Kingdom, it is perhaps not surprising that
themajority of themwould like to continue to live in the United Kingdom.I very much feel like a part of the UK, which is why Brexit
makes me sad. They're cutting away from the EU, so
people who move here after Brexit will feel like they
don't belong or are intruding, and no one should feel
that way. (Survey Respondent, female, 16, from Poland)
Although the EU referendum has made the futures of
many European migrants uncertain, I love this country
and will do anything in my power to stay here as it is
my home. (Survey Respondent, female, 15, from Poland)However, the expressed desire of many of the CEE young people
to stay living in Britain needs to be considered within the context of
both their everyday lives and the life course. For some young people,
the familiarity of their everyday routines and networks provided secu-
rity in the midst of Brexit uncertainty and rupture; it was the stability
of their everyday lives that they were seeking to preserve by wanting
to remain in Britain. This is similar to the findings of research with
young migrants in other contexts, where “the everyday” is crucial to
their experiences of, and plans for, migration (see Coe et al., 2011).
Many of the young people were ambitious for their futures and were
considering the next stage in their life course when deciding whether
or not they wanted to remain in Britain. Often, they wanted to finish
their education in Britain (70.2% of survey respondents) and make the
most of the educational opportunities that they thought living in Britain
offered them, but Brexit had introduced uncertainty into their plans.I have big aspirations for my future in terms of education
and I dream to attend Oxbridge, but I fear for my future
in England due to Brexit … tuition fees … visas …
citizenship … student loans …. (Survey Respondent,
female, 15, from Romania)
[…] Because of Brexit, I do not know whether university
fees will be higher for me or not ‐ I don't know whether
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here. I do hope to study in the UK though. However, after
my studies, if living in the UK turns out to be harder after
leaving the EU, I would return to the EU or the EEA
(preferably France or Norway). (Survey Respondent,
female, 17, from Poland)In their study of Polish adult migrants, McGhee, Moreh, and
Vlachantoni (2017) argue that basic socio‐economic and demographic
factors are inadequate to explain future migration and civic integration
plans. Instead, they assert that interest in and awareness of one's
rights and anxieties about the ability to maintain one's rights in the
future are stronger determinants. Whether young people are allowed
to remain living in the United Kingdom depends on the arrangements
that the British government put in place for non‐British EU citizens
when Britain is no longer part of the EU and the majority of young
people were very aware of this.6I hope me and my family will stay here, that Brexit won't
make us leave England, as I prefer living here than in
Poland. England is my new home now and I feel like I'm
part English. (Survey Respondent, female, 16, from Poland)
I'm not sure whether I will be sent back with my family,
back to my Home country? (Survey Respondent, female,
14, from Poland)The status and rights of non‐British EU citizens living in the United
Kingdom have retained a high profile since the Brexit negotiations
between Britain and the EU began. British citizenship is costly and the
detailed arrangements of “settled status” for non‐British EU nationals
are unclear (see Roulet, 2018). Although the majority of the young peo-
ple had retained the citizenship of their birth country and had not
become British citizens, more of them were making citizenship applica-
tions and some families were prioritising children's applications:I am worried about the legal safety of people like me. My
parents are currently sorting out legal documents
(permanent residency, British citizenship etc.) to ensure
that we are completely safe from any changes to laws
that may happen after leaving the EU. It is an uncertain
time, and despite promises that EU citizens living here
already will be safe and will not be deported etc., it
leaves us in a vulnerable and uncomfortable position.
(Survey Respondent, female, 17, from Hungary)
It's unfair that we need to apply for British citizenship
and spend a lot of money, when a lot of people can't
afford it, but have become part of the British
community. (Survey Respondent, male, 16, from Poland)During the period of Brexit uncertainty, CEE young people and
their families were experiencing personal insecurity about their future
lives, and this was having an immediate and deeply felt impact. The
young people in our study often discussed the intergenerational dif-
ferences that were occurring within their families with regard to their
plans for the future in the context of the EU Referendum result. Strat-
egies for overcoming the uncertainty that the Brexit rupture hascaused—specifically rights to remain living, being educated and work-
ing in the United Kingdom—were not always perceived similarly by
parents and children (from the young people's perspectives).My parents want to move out [of the UK], but I started
school here and don't want any complications regarding
the school system. Unlike many English kids my age, I
want a well‐paid career. (Survey Respondent, female,
14, from Poland)Drawing on recent migration studies that have highlighted the
importance of intergenerational relations and overlapping life courses
(Sime & Pietka‐Nykaza, 2015; Tyrrell et al., 2012), it is important to
consider the wider ramifications of Brexit uncertainty for CEE young
people in the context of their family lives. As many of these young
people are transitioning from childhood to youth and adulthood, they
are also experiencing transitions associated with migration changed by
Brexit. Some young people felt that their parents had always consid-
ered returning to their country of origin as an option, but that Brexit
had made it more of a possibility than before. This discussion from a
focus group gives an interesting account of the intergenerational deci-
sions that were being discussed in some CEE families in Brexit Britain,
within the wider context of their migration experiences:Participant 1: Yeah, my mum and dad were discussing about mov-
ing back, the same with him as well [meaning Partic-
ipant 3].Participant 2: And me. But I want to stay here for now and go to
America.Participant 1: Because since they dragged us out here at such a
young age, we are used to living here and we do
not want to move back because we'd have to learn
the language over again, since we are starting to for-
get it. And then we would have to go back to school
for another year.[…]Interviewer 1: Is there anywhere that's problematic for you that
you would not go?Participant 1: Back to our original country.Participant 3: Yeah. I mean, I'd go on holiday, obviously, but not to
stay there.Participant 2: Yeah, it's just not right, I guess. […] They have [par-
ents] been talking about going back ever since we
got here. They do not feel very comfortable here,
so they just want to move back.[…]Participant 1: My parents have wanted to go back since Brexit
started, like the rumour around it. They started
wanting to go back more and more. They were
thinking about going back as soon as I finish Year
11, but then they changed it until I finish college.
[…]They think it'd be better for us, but we think dif-
ferent, because we know what it's like and we are
used to living here. Our parents are quite old and
they are (laughs) used to that lifestyle and the way
to live down there, and we are used to living here.(Participant 1: male, 16, from Poland; Participant 2: male, 15, from Poland;
Participant 3: male, 15, from Slovakia)
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right to belong in the United Kingdom into question and caused uncer-
tainty over their futures in the United Kingdom, at the time that many
of them were becoming young adults and reflexively negotiating their
feelings of belonging. If they were of an age when they and their par-
ents felt that they could make independent decisions, then they might
experience the rupture of family fragmentation (again)—with family
members deciding differently about whether to leave or remain—and
potentially the rupture of another migration, this time out of Britain.
The possibility of intergenerational divergence was recognised by
some of the stakeholder interviewees. They felt that Brexit had
caused further uncertainty for these young people at a critical point
in the life course.Some families where maybe the longer‐term plan has
never been to always remain in Scotland, there's always
been an intention, not a firm plan, but an intention to
return at some point. And then young people are
getting to the stage where they're making their own
plans for their future, and do they then make their
plans for remaining in Scotland where they've formed
friendships, they've got a network, or do they think
about returning? And if so, what does that look like?
(Stakeholder Interviewee – EAL teacher, Scotland)
I suppose what really comes to mind is around families
where there's a sense of, particularly in the current
climate, where there's an increasing sense of
uncertainty, you know, about whether the families are
always going to remain the UK, leave UK, you know. It's
a very troubling, difficult thing as a teenager, having to
make decisions at that age at the same time as thinking
about studies and, you know, potential career paths,
but also uncertain as to whether your family's going to
remain in UK, move back to Poland, then you're going
to lose your friends that you've made, in fact you're
going to have to make another big shift in your life.
(Stakeholder Interviewee – Diversity Officer, County
Council, England)Although the majority of young people wanted to remain living in
Britain, at least until they had completed their education, the impact of
Brexit on key transitions in the life course, such as from education to
employment, was considered by some young people. Difficulties asso-
ciated with being an EU citizen living in Brexit Britain were also being
thought through by young people.I plan to finish university in England, but go work abroad,
as I don't believe I belong in England especially after
Brexit, and when I think about it, I don't want to spend
the rest of my life here, because I feel like it would be
too hard for me to travel back to my country and I will
never be accepted here. (Survey Respondent, female, 16,
from Lithuania)For some young people, the rupture that they had experienced in
their initial migration to Britain as a child had encouraged them toconsider future migrations as a possibility, finding comfort in the idea
that they had migrated once, they could migrate again.I plan to move to America and become a lawyer there. I
feel like I want to travel the world and moving from
Poland to England made me realize it's not that bad of
a change. I want to meet new people and just enjoy my
life. (Survey Respondent, female, 15, from Poland)Young people discussed that their parents were focused either on
staying in Brexit Britain, depending on the terms of their right to
remain, or return to their countries of origin. However, young people
themselves were open to the possibilities of moving to another EU
country or further afield, if Brexit Britain did not offer them the right
opportunities:I hope to study theoretical physics, and carry out
research in the UK or France depending on opportunity.
I hope my residency in the U.K. will be confirmed and
student loans etc. will be applicable to me. (Survey
Respondent, female, 17, from Slovakia)These young people's plans to out‐migrate and seek opportunities
elsewhere fit with the Bauman's (2000) concept of “liquid migration”
and King's (2018) wider definition of “lifestyle migration.” The wider
context of the decisions that they are making about their futures are
hugely relevant: They have experienced migration during childhood—
a rupture to their feelings of belonging during the formative belonging
life stage; they are now experiencing Brexit—another rupture that is
disrupting their feelings of, and rights to, belonging during childhood
or at the cusp of youth. As Britain is the place where these young peo-
ple spent the majority of their childhood, their “being” and “becoming”
life stage, it is not surprising that many of them feel a strong sense of
belonging to Britain. The ways in which the multiple ruptures they
have experienced will impact upon their lives, and indeed, the society
and economy of Britain, depends on the outcome of the Brexit nego-
tiations and decisions made by the British government. Many of the
young people felt powerless during this period of Brexit uncertainty.
The majority hoped that they would be allowed to remain in the
United Kingdom, whilst at the same time, many of them felt that they
should plan for a future beyond Brexit Britain.6 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined the opinions and experiences of 1.5 gener-
ation CEE‐born young people living in Brexit Britain gleaned from a
national online survey, focus groups and adult stakeholder interviews
across England and Scotland. We focused on two key themes that
emerged from the data: (a) young people's feelings of belonging to
Britain, their countries of birth and Europe, and the ways in which
these have been impacted by the EU Referendum result; (b) young
people's future plans, in an intergenerational context, with particular
regard to their feelings of belonging and the ruptures of migration
and Brexit.
The uncertainty for CEE‐born 1.5 generation young people, and
their families, caused by Britain's decision to “Leave” the EU occurred
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are (their beings), who they can be (their becomings) and where and
who they do/will feel attached to (their belongings). For CEE‐born
young people who have experienced the rupture of child migration,
have spent much of their childhood in Britain, have experienced a
large proportion (if not all) of their education in the British education
system, and cannot necessarily remember living in their countries of
birth (even though they might often visit them), Brexit is a source of
anxiety and fear. Although a small number of young people in our
study felt a very strong sense of belonging to Britain and called Britain
“home” (and only a very small number felt the opposite), the majority
of the young people asserted a sense of belonging to Britain, whilst
simultaneously feeling a sense of in‐between‐ness that has been
observed in other studies of migrant children—they did not feel that
they entirely “fitted in” to society in Britain (where they lived) or their
birth country (often that of their citizenship). For some young people,
Brexit uncertainty had ruptured their developing sense of belonging to
Britain because their right to belong (as EU citizens) had been called
into question at a time when they were planning their futures in the
United Kingdom. As they were overcoming the rupture of childhood
migration itself, Brexit has introduced another rupture in their lives,
one that was unexpected and highly significant for their future plans.
For some other young people, the rupture of migrating from CEE
countries to Britain during childhood had made them more open to
the possibility of migrating again—out of Brexit Britain in search of
better opportunities, just as their parents had done when moving to
pre‐Brexit Britain.
Our study gives some indication of the “what next?” question for
1.5 generation CEE‐born migrants living in Britain in the context of
Brexit. Many of the young people in our study want to remain living
Britain, at least in the short term, and feel a sense of belonging to Brit-
ain, where they assert and experience coexisting belongings. With
Brexit, a top tier of the citizenship‐identity hierarchy (i.e. EU citizen-
ship) is unravelling for British young people, whilst at the same time,
it is becoming reasserted for CEE‐born young people living in Britain
—they are “othered” because they are EU migrants. EU citizenship
enabled these young people's free movement but the external forces
of Brexit are now disrupting perceptions of their right to belong in
Britain and causing unprecedented uncertainty over their futures.
Our focus on the intergenerational impact of Brexit in CEE migrant
families living in Britain, from young people's perspectives, suggests
that children and parents may view possibilities for the future differ-
ently. In the short term, young people seem keen to maintain stability
in their everyday lives by completing their education in Britain,
whereas some of their parents are keen to out‐migrate. In some fam-
ilies, young people are keen to seek a perceived better future by out‐
migrating, whereas parents wish to remain in Britain. In line with
King's (2018) broadening of the concept of “lifestyle migration,” the
“what next?” for CEE 1.5 generation young people and their families
may depend on the socio‐economic conditions of post‐Brexit Britain.
It remains to be seen whether Britain will retain the young CEE 1.5
generation migrants who have been educated here, often developed
a sense of belonging to Britain, and had planned prosperous futures
there, or whether they will engage in liquid migration—leaving an age-
ing parent population who feel uncertain about post‐Brexit Britain.There is an urgent need for more research on the intergenerational
impact of Brexit on EU citizen families currently living in Britain.
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ENDNOTES
1 ESRC Grant ES/M011038/1
2 Case studies with 20 families—young people and parents—are ongoing,
so the data are not included in this paper.
3 This was a convenience sample, and the data could not be weighted due
to the absence of existing reliable data on EU nationals in the United
Kingdom.
4 Respondents could choose more than one option.
5 The relationship between participants' feelings of belonging in the
United Kingdom and years they had lived in the country was investi-
gated using Spearman's rank order correlation (ρ). There was a small,
positive correlation between the two variables ρ = 0.179, n = 879,
p < 0.001, with stronger feelings of belonging to the United Kingdom
associated with longer length of stay.
6 The survey took place before “settled status” for EU nationals was
announced.
ORCID
Naomi Tyrrell http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7036-3291
Daniela Sime http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3207-5456
REFERENCES
Bartley, A., & Spoonley, P. (2008). Intergenerational transnationalism: 1.5
generation Asian migrants in New Zealand. International Migration
Review, 46(4), 63–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468‐2435.2008.
00472.x
Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity. Cambridge: Polity.
Burnett, J. (2016). Racial violence and the Brexit state. London: Institute of
Race Relations.
Clarke, H., Goodwin, M., & Whiteley, P. (2017). Brexit: Why Britain voted to
leave the European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Coe, C., Reynolds, R., Boehm, D., Meredith Hess, J., & Rae‐Espinoza, H.
(2011). Everyday ruptures: Children, youth and migration in global per-
spective. Nashvilee: Vanderbilt University Press.
De Lima, P. (2012). Boundary crossings: Migration, belonging/‘un‐belong-
ing’ in rural Scotland. In C. Hedberg, & R. Carmo (Eds.), Translocal
ruralism: Mobility and connectivity in European rural space. New York:
Springer.
Dustmann, C., & Frattini, T. (2014). The fiscal effects of immigration to the
UK. The Economic Journal, 124, 593–643. https://doi.org/10.1111/
ecoj.12181
Forbes, J., & Sime, D. (2016). Relations between child poverty and new
migrant child status, academic attainment and social participation:
Insights using social capital theory. Education and Science, 6, 1–15.
https://doi.org/10.3390/educsci6030024
Fulbrook, M. (2011). Dissonant voices: Generations and violence though the
German dictatorships. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gardner, K. (2012). Transnational migration and the study of children: An
introduction. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 38(6), 889–912.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2012.677170.
10 of 10 TYRRELL ET AL.James, A., & Prout, A. (1997). Constructing and reconstructing childhood:
Contemporary issues in the sociological study of childhood. London and
New York: Routledge.
Kim, J., & Duff, P. A. (2012). The language socialization and identity
negotiations of generation 1.5 Korean‐Canadian university students.
TESL Canada Journal, 29(6), 81–102. https://doi.org/10.18806/tesl.
v29i0.1111
King, R. (2018). Theorising new European youth mobilities. Population,
Space and Place, 24, e2117. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2117
Lulle, A., Moroşanu, L., & King, R. (2018). And then came Brexit: Experiences
and future plans of young EU migrants in the London region. Population,
Space and Place, 24, e2122. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2122
McGhee, D., Heath, S., & Trevena, P. (2013). Competing Obligations and
the Maintenance of Physical Co‐presence: The Impact of Migration
and Structural Constraints on Post‐accession Polish Families in the
UK. Families, Relationships and Societies, 2(2), 229–245. https://doi.
org/10.1332/204674313X664914.
McGhee, D., Moreh, C., & Vlachantoni, A. (2017). An ‘undeliberate deter-
minacy’? The changing migration strategies of Polish migrants in the
UK in times of Brexit. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(13),
2109–2130. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1299622.
Moskal, M. (2016). Spaces of not belonging. Scottish Geographical Journal,
132(1), 85–102. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702541.2015.1084028
Moskal, M., & Tyrrell, N. (2016). Family migration decision‐making, step‐
migration and separation: Children's experiences in European migrant
workers families. Children's Geographies, 14(4), 453–467. https://doi.
org/10.1080/14733285.2015.1116683
Ní Laoire, C., Carpena‐Mendez, J., Tyrrell, N., & White, A. (2010). Children
and migration: Identities, home and belongings. Childhood, 17(2),
155–162. https://doi.org/10.1177/0907568210365463
Office for National Statistics (2017a) Migration statistics: Quarterly
report (November 2017), Available online: https://www.ons.gov.uk/
peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/
internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/
november2017
Office for National Statistics (2017b) Migration since the Brexit vote:
What's changed in six charts. Available online: https://visual.ons.gov.
uk/migration‐since‐the‐brexit‐vote‐whats‐changed‐in‐six‐charts/
O'Reilly, K., & Benson, M. (2009). Lifestyle migration: Escaping to the good
life? In M. Benson, & K. O'Reilly (Eds.), Lifestyle migration: Expectations,
aspirations and experiences. (pp. 1–13). Farnham: Ashgate.
Ross, A. (2015). Understanding the constructions of identities by young
new Europeans: Kaleidoscopic selves. In London. New York: Routledge
Taylor Francis.
Roulet, T. (2018) EU citizens in Britain are already being stigmatised—And
it's likely to get worse. Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
politicsandpolicy/eu‐citizens‐in‐brexit‐britain/Ryan, L. (2018). Differentiated embedding: Polish migrants in London
negotiating belonging over time. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,
44(2), 233–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1341710
Shubin, S. (2012). Living on the move. Population, Space and Place, 18,
615–627. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.696
Sime, D., & Fox, R. (2015). Home abroad: Eastern European children's
family and peer relationships after migration. Childhood, 22(3),
377–393. https://doi.org/10.1080/14708477.2014.993324.
Sime, D., & Pietka‐Nykaza, E. (2015). Transnational intergenerationalities:
Cultural learning in Polish migrant families and its implications for ped-
agogy. Language and Intercultural Communication, 15(2), 208–223.
Stocker, P. (2017). English uprising: Brexit and the mainstreaming of far Right.
Brooklyn, NY: Melville House.
Sumsion, J., & Wong, S. (2011). Belonging, being and becoming: The early
years learning framework for Australia. Contemporary Issues in Early
Childhood, 12(1), 28–45. https://doi.org/10.2304/ciec.2011.12.1.28.
Tisdall, E., & Punch, S. (2012). Not so ‘new’? Looking critically at childhood
studies. Children's Geographies, 10, 249–264. https://doi.org/10.1080/
14733285.2012.693376
Tyrrell, N., & Kraftl, P. (2015). Migration and the lifecourse. In D. Smith, N.
Finney, K. Halfacree, & N. Walford (Eds.), Internal migration: Geographic
processes and perspectives. Farnham: Ashgate.
Tyrrell, N., White, A., Ní Laoire, C., & Carpena‐Mendez, F. (Eds.) (2012).
Transnational migration and childhood. London, New York: Routledge
Taylor Francis.
Vildaitė, D. (2016) Transnational experiences of youth and family migra-
tion: Intergenerational perspectives PhD thesis, Dublin: Trinity College.
Virdee, S., & McGeever, B. (2017). Racism, crisis, Brexit. Ethnic
and Racial Studies. OnlineFirst https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.
2017.13611544
White, A., Ní Laoire, C., Tyrrell, N., & Carpena‐Mendez, J. (2011). Children's
roles in transnational migration. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,
37(8), 1159–1170. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.590635
Worth, N. (2009). Understanding youth transitions as a ‘becoming’: Iden-
tity, time and futurity. Geoforum, 40(6), 1050–1060. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.07.007
Zubida, H., Lavi, L., Harper, R. A., Nakash, O., & Shoshani, A. (2013). Home
and away: Hybrid perspective on identity formation in 1.5 and second
generation adolescent immigrants in Israel. Glocalism: Journal of Culture,
Politics and Innovation, 1–28. https://doi.org/10.12893/gjcpi.2013.1.6
How to cite this article: Tyrrell N, Sime D, Kelly C, McMellon
C. Belonging in Brexit Britain: Central and Eastern European
1.5 generation young people's experiences. Popul Space Place.
2019;25:e2205. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2205
